Estimation of Matching Models With and Without Transferable Utility
Fields Institute, September 17, 2014 (4h)
Description of the Course
This lecture aims at providing an empirical framework for matching models with heterogeneity in tastes and general transfer technologies. It is organized in two parts:
1. Generalized Entropy of Choice and Capacity-constrained Discrete Choice. We first revisit the literature on random utility models by emphasizing the role of a proper generalization of the notion of entropy, defined using Legendre transforms. The duality between the selection model and the assignment model follows, as well as the duality between the equilibrium characterization problem and the identification problem.
2. Equilibrium characterization and identification in matching models. The previous theory is then applied to characterize equilibrium and provide identification in matching models with imperfectly transferable utility (ITU), including as special cases both the transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) models.
Bonnet, O., Galichon, A., and M. Shum, “Yoghurt chooses man: estimating nonadditive discrete choice models”
Chiong, K., Galichon, A., and M. Shum, “Duality in dynamic discrete choice models”
Galichon, A., “DARUM: Deferred Acceptance for Random Utility Models”.
Galichon, A., S. D. Kominers and S. Weber, “Costly Concessions: Estimating the Unintended Consequences of Policy Intervention in Matching Markets”
Galichon, A. and B. Salanié, “Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models”